Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

Judith Campbell Jackson v. Robert Mateus and Kris
Mateus : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Roger H. Bullock; Peter H. Barlow; Strong & Hanni; Attorneys for Appellant.
Lynn S. Davies; Melinda A. Morgan; Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson; Attorneys for Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Jackson v. Mateus, No. 20010387.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1844

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JUDITH CAMPBELL JACKSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
ROBERT MATEUS and
KRIS MATEUS,
Defendants/Appellees

Case No: 20010387-SC

Priority No.

15

BRIEF OF APPELLANT JUDITH CAMPBELL JACKSON

Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley

Roger H. Bullock (Bar No. 485)
Peter H. Barlow (Bar No. 7808)
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
600 Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

Lynn S. Davies (Bar No. 824)
Melinda A. Morgan (Bar No. 8392)
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER &
NELSON
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
Key Bank Tower, 7th Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465

FILED
UTAH SUPREME COURT

OCT 1 5 2001
PAT BARTHOLOMEW
CLERK OF THE COURT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JUDITH CAMPBELL JACKSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.

ROBERT MATEUS and
KRIS MATEUS,
Defendants/Appellees.

Case No: 20010387-SC

BRIEF OF APPELLANT JUDITH CAMPBELL JACKSON

Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley

Roger H. Bullock (Bar No. 485)
Peter H. Barlow (Bar No. 7808)
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
600 Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

Lynn S. Davies (Bar No. 824)
Melinda A. Morgan (Bar No. 8392)
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER &
NELSON
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
Key Bank Tower, 7th Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
The names of all parties to the proceedings in the lower court are set forth in the
caption of the case on appeal.
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Vlll

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(j), as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
Issue #1: Whether on defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff
presented sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of negligence against the
Mateuses for their failure to control and/or restrain their cat so as to prevent the cat's
attack on Mrs. Jackson.
Standard of Review for Issue #1: The Supreme Court reviews the trial court's
summary judgment ruling for correctness. Kessler v. Mortenson. 16 P.3d 1225, 1226
(Utah 2000). The appellate court considers only whether the trial court correctly
applied the law and correcdy concluded that no disputed issues of material fact existed.
Aurora Credit Servs.. Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev.. Inc.. 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah
1998). This is the standard of review applied because summary judgment is appropriate
only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
UtahR. Civ. P. 56(c).
Issue #2: Whether the trial court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that no
1

genuine issue of material exists regarding whether the Mateuses had any duty to control
or restrain their cat, or to prevent their cat's attack.
Standard of Review for Issue #2: The issue of "whether a 'duty' exists is a
question of law" which appellate courts review for correctness. Weber v. Springville
City. 725 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah 1986). Moreover, when deciding whether the trial
court correctly found that there was no genuine issue of material fact, appellate courts
review the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
losing party. See id Additionally, because summary judgment is granted as a matter of
law, appellate courts give the trial court's legal conclusions no deference and review
the decision for correctness. See White v. Gary L. Deseelhorst. NP Ski Corp., 879
P.2dl371, 1374 (Utah 1994).
Issue #3: Whether the trial court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that there
were no disputed material facts regarding whether the Mateuses' cat's attack on Mrs.
Jackson was unforeseeable.
Standard of Review for Issue #3: See Standards of Review for Issue #2.
Issue #4: Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that
defendants did not violate Salt Lake County Ordinances, §§ 8.24.010, 8.04.210, and
8.24.030.

2

Standard of Review for Issue #4: An appellate court grants a trial court's
construction of statutes or ordinances no deference, but reviews the decision for
correctness. See Platts v. Parents Helping Parents. 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997).
Moreover, whether a statute applies to a particular set of facts is a question of law that
an appellate court reviews de novo. See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994);
see also State v. Waite. 803 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Utah 1990).
Issue #5: Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that the
Mateuses' cat was lawfully on the Jackson's property when the attack occurred.
Standard of Review for Issue #5: See Standard of Review for Issue No. #1.
Issue #6: Whether the trial court erred in holding as a matter of law that a cat is
allowed one free bite before its owners may be held liable for injuries inflicted by the
cat.
Standard of Review for Issue #6; See Standard of Review for Issue No. #1.
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 4-25-4
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-64
Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1 (1998)
Salt Lake County Ordinance § 8.24.010
Salt Lake County Ordinance § 8.24.030
3

Salt Lake County Ordinance § 8.04.210
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
On January 15, 1996, the Mateuses' cat attacked Judith Campbell Jackson, who
was severely injured by the unprovoked attack. Mrs. Jackson brought an action in the
Third District Court against the Mateuses for negligence in failing to restrain and
control their pet. Mrs. Jackson appeals from the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the Mateuses on all of Mrs. Jackson's claims.
Statement of Facts
This case arises out of an unprovoked attack by the Mateuses' cat on Mrs.
Jackson during the early morning hours of January 15, 1996. (R. 128). The attack
occurred on Mrs. Jackson's own property, just outside of a sliding glass door which
leads from the Jacksons' living room to a second story deck. (R. 128). Mrs. Jackson
mistook the Mateuses' cat for her own cat, and opened the sliding glass door. (R.
129.) She called out the name of her cat, and extended her hand. (R. 129). The
Mateuses' cat approached Mrs. Jackson, and she briefly petted the cat and then
recognized that it was not hers. (R. 129). The Mateuses' cat suddenly attacked Mrs.
4

Jackson, inflicting severe bites and scratches to Mrs. Jackson's hand and arm. (R. 129,
160-61). At no time did Mrs. Jackson provoke the cat. (R. 160). At no time did the
Jacksons ever grant authorization to the Mateuses to allow the cat on the Jacksons'
property. (R. 163-66).
Mrs. Jackson identified the cat that attacked her as a "[y]ellow tiger tabby,
wearing a collar, green, at least in part with a bell, well nourished, gender unknown." (R.
161). Richard Jackson, her husband, following directions of Salt Lake County animal
control personnel, set traps soon after the attack, and trapped a cat exactly matching the
description given by Mrs. Jackson. (R. 161). The trapped cat was taken to animal
control, where the Jacksons encountered Robert Mateus, the Jacksons' neighbor. (R. 16162.) Although the Mateuses have made some attempt to deny ownership of the cat that
attacked and injured Mrs. Jackson, both Mrs. Jackson and her husband heard Mr. Mateus
state that the cat that had been trapped was "clearly" his cat. (R. 161-62.) For purposes
of their summary judgment motion, the Mateuses did not dispute ownership of the cat. (R.
130.)
After the Mateuses' cat attacked Mrs. Jackson, the cat was often seen in the
Jacksons' yard. (R. 163). Mr. Jackson encountered the Mateuses' cat on his backyard
deck near their patio door. (R. 163). He donned a pair of heavy leather gloves and
proceeded to scratch the cat under the chin. (R. 163). The cat leaned into him apparently
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enjoying the attention and then suddenly attacked Mr. Jackson's hand. (R. 163-64.)
Based on the record of evidence, every time the Mateuses' cat has encountered a person,
other than the Mateuses, an attack has occurred. (R. 160-61, 163-64). Subsequent to the
second attack by their cat, the Mateuses continued to allow the cat to roam free, and the
cat was routinely seen in the Jacksons' yard. (R. 165).
The bites inflicted by the Mateuses' cat forced Mrs. Jackson to undergo surgery on
her hand to combat the severe infection that resulted from the bites. (R. 166). Dr.
Vanderhoof, the doctor who performed the surgery on Mrs. Jackson, stated in his
deposition that cat bites are particularly virulent because cats have long, sharp teeth, and
the animals' mouths are filthy and contain bacteria that causes severe infections.
(R. 166). Dr. Vanderhoof also stated that cat bites tended to be more problematic, in
terms of resulting serious infections, than dog bites. (R. 166).
Prior to being attacked by the Mateuses' cat, Mrs. Jackson had a medically stable
autoimmune disorder. (R. 165-66.) The severe and widespread infection inflicted by the
cat bites resulted in throwing the autoimmune disorder into a state of medical instability,
and caused her to have to undergo several surgeries. (R. 166). In 1998, Mrs. Jackson
was forced to undergo a procedure on her esophagus that was closed up by strictures,
which left her with a severely painful throat. (R. 167). In 1999, Mrs. Jackson was
required to have her submandibular salivary glands removed due to their propensity to
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become infected as a direct result of the aggravation of her autoimmune disorder. (R.
167). The removal of the submandibular salivary glands deprived Mrs. Jackson of the
ability to produce saliva. (R. 167). Now Mrs. Jackson is prone to oral lesions, and
develops bone spurs in her mouth that must be removed periodically. (R. 167).
In addition, as a result of the cat attack and resulting infection, Mrs. Jackson
developed Frey's syndrome, which causes gustatory salivation. (R. 167). The
condition causes the nerve endings from the parotid glands to attach to the sweat glands
in the side of the face and resulted in the production of drenching sweat on the sides of
Mrs. Jackson's face when she ate. (R. 167). Mrs. Jackson was forced to undergo
surgery in which her sternocleidomastoid muscle was dissected and a portion of the
muscle was pulled into her cheek to create a barrier between the nerve endings and the
sweat glands to correct the condition. (R. 167). The surgery left a noticeable scar
along Mrs. Jackson's jaw line just below her ear. (R. 167-68).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court erred in granting the Mateuses' motion for summary judgment
because it had evidence of negligence on the part of the Mateuses. The district court
failed to apply the common law which requires animal owners to exercise reasonable
control over their animals and prevent injuries to others. This rule of law was discussed
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in the case ofPullanv. Steinmetz, 16 P.3d 1245 (Utah 2000), but not applied, as
articulated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518.
The court below also erred in failing to hold that the Mateuses were negligent for
violating Salt Lake County Ordinances, which are safety statutes designed to prevent
attacks by animals. The ordinances impose liability for animal owners' negligence
regardless of the owner's knowledge of an animal's propensity to bite. A jury
considering such statutes could have found that the Mateuses were negligent in failing to
control their cat and prevent the attack on Mrs. Jackson.
The Mateuses argued, and the district court agreed that a cat is entitled to one free
bite before liability may be imposed on the owner. The one free bite rule is falling into
disfavor in many jurisdictions as evidenced by the enactment of strict liability dog bite
statutes. There is no logical or just reason why cat owners should be allowed to escape
liability when dog owners are held liable for the first bite of their pets. The reasons
articulated in PuUan by the Court for not extending liability under the dog bite statute to
horse owners do not apply to cats. As predatory animals capable of inflicting serious and
life changing injuries, cats should be treated in a manner similar to dogs. The Mateuses
should be held liable for failing to control their pet and for allowing it to attack and
severely injure Mrs. Jackson.

8

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Court should reverse the judgment of the trial court that granted summary
judgment to the defendants, and the case should be allowed to go to trial and have a jury
decide the disputed factual issues.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
MRS. JACKSON'S NEGLIGENCE
CLAIMS AGAINST THE MATEUSES
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DECIDED
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
a.

Summary judgment is rarely the appropriate procedure for
resolving a negligence claim.

The trial court erred in stripping Mrs. Jackson of her right to have her negligence
claims against the Mateuses heard before a jury. Mrs. Jackson has presented evidence
showing that the defendants were negligent in allowing their cat to injure her. This Court
has mled that summary judgment is rarely an appropriate remedy for resolving negligence
actions, Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 728 (Utah 1985), and this case does not
present the rare situation where summary judgment for the defendant was clear or
unmistakable.
The trial court also erred in usurping the jury's prerogative to determine whether
the Mateuses breached the required standard of care, as that question is generally a jury
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question, Jackson v. Dabnev. 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982), to be determined by whether the
injury which occurred was of the type that fell within the zone of risk created by the
defendants' negligent conduct. 'The care to be exercised in any particular case depends
upon the circumstances of that case and on the extent of foreseeable danger involved and
must be determined as a question of fact." DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433,
435 (Utah 1983); see also Eaton v. Savage, 502 P.2d 564 (Utah 1972); Wheeler v. Jones,
431 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1967).
b.

Summary judgment was improperly granted where Mrs. Jackson
presented a prima facie case of negligence against the Mateuses.

A prima facie case of negligence requires a showing of: (1) a duty of reasonable
care extending to plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate and actual causation of
the injury; and (4) damages suffered by plaintiff. Williams, 699 P.2d at 726. The court
erred in finding that Mrs. Jackson did not present a prima facie case of negligence against
the Mateuses. Specifically, the district court erred in holding that the Mateuses did not
have a duty to protect Mrs. Jackson from their cat and that, absent a showing that the cat
had attacked anyone before, the attack on Mrs. Jackson was unforeseeable. (See, R. 530).

However, Utah law, as articulated in Pullan v. Steinmetz, 16 P.3d 1245 (Utah
2000) and Salt Lake County's ordinances do not require a showing, in certain instances,

10

that an animal owner had prior knowledge of an animal's viciousness in order to hold
them liable for their animal's attacks. The district court should have held the Mateuses
liable for failing to restrain and control their cat and for failing to control their cat so as to
prevent the attack on Mrs. Jackson. At the very least, the court should have allowed a
jury to determine whether the Mateuses were negligent.
For purposes of their summary judgment motion, the Mateuses conceded that their
cat attacked and injured Mrs. Jackson. The Mateuses submitted an affidavit in which
they professed a lack of knowledge of their cat's vicious tendencies. However, contrary
evidence was also submitted to the district court that the Mateuses' cat inflicted a vicious,
unprovoked attack on Mrs. Jackson. Moreover, the trial court had evidence from Richard
Jackson that the Mateuses' cat had also attacked him and that, as an owner of cats
himself, it was his observation that the Mateuses' cat "had a mean streak." This evidence,
and all inferences which can be drawn from it, viewed in a light most favorable to Mrs.
Jackson, showed that the Mateuses knew or should have known of the vicious and illtempered tendencies of their cat. Based on the evidence before the trial court, summary
judgment should not have been granted.
The district court also received evidence consisting of Salt Lake County Ordinance
§ 8.24.010, which defines a vicious animal as one which "bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or
otherwise attacks a human being..." Salt Lake County Ord. § 8.24.010(B). Under a plain
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reading of the § 8.24.010, prior knowledge of an animal's viciousness is irrelevant for
purposes of imposing liability for injuries inflicted by an animal. This evidence presented
a genuine issue of material fact as to the viciousness of the cat, and should have precluded
summary judgment. The trial court erred in ignoring such evidence and in granting
summary judgment for the Mateuses.
POINT II:
DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE LIABLE
FOR BREACHING THEIR COMMON
LAW DUTIES TO CONTROL THEIR CAT.
a.

The common law requires that pet owners control their animals.

The district court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that the Mateuses had no duty
to control their cat. The court also erred in failing to rule that the Mateuses did not
exercise reasonable care to keep their animal under control. Commentators, citing the
common law, have recognized that domestic animal owners have a duty to control their
pets:
[u]nder the common law, as articulated in the Restatement, Torts 2d § 518,
even if the owner or keeper of a domesticated animal does not know or have
reason to know that the animal is abnormally dangerous, he has a duty to
exercise reasonable care to keep the animal under control.
Cheryl M. Bailey, Annotation, Liability for Injuries Caused by Cat, 68 ALR 4th 823, 829
(1989) (emphasis added). The Annotation also states: "[i]n some jurisdictions, statutes
have abrogated that requirement [that owners know of their animal's viciousness],
12

imposing liability on the owner or keeper of a domesticated animal even though he did
not know of its viciousness or mischievous propensities." Id. at 830.l In this case, at the
very least, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the defendants
exercised reasonable care in keeping their cat under control. The district court erred by
failing to find that the Mateuses did not exercise reasonable care to keep their animal
under control, especially in light of the fact that the cat had no right to be on the Jackson's
property when the attack occurred.
b.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518 states that an animal owner
has a duty to control its animals.

Mrs. Jackson alleged in her Complaint that: "Defendants negligently failed to
restrain and control their cat, proximately resulting in the attack and bite, and plaintiffs
injury and damages." (R. 1.) Under the common law, an animal owner has a duty to
exercise reasonable care to keep the animal under control. Restatement (Second) of Torts
§518, articulates that duty and imposes a duty of reasonable care upon an animal owner
to control its animals. Section 518 states in pertinent part:
one who possesses or harbors a domestic animal that he does not know or
have reason to know to be abnormally dangerous, is subject to liability for
harm done by the animal, but only if:
(b) he is negligent for failing to prevent the harm.

1

As will be shown below, Utah has enacted such a statute. See, Utah Code Ann.
§ 18-1-1, etseq.
13

See also Drake v. Dean, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325, 331 (Cal. App. 1993) (quoting Section 518
and stating that "[t]he common law recognizes negligence as a distinct legal theory of
recovery for harm caused by domestic animals that are not abnormally dangerous.")
Comment e of Section 518 states that animal owners are "under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to have them under a constant and effective control." Moreover,
comment h of Section 518 mandates that an owner is "required to realize that even
ordinarily gentle animals are likely to be dangerous under particular circumstances and to
exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm." Whether or not the Mateuses had
prior knowledge of their cat's viciousness, under common law, they can and should be
held liable for injuries inflicted by their animal based on their failure to control the animal
or their failure to take steps to prevent their animal from coming into contact, without
their supervision, with other persons.
c.

Foreseeability under the Pullan v. Steinmetz case.

This Court recently addressed the issue of whether to adopt Restatement (Second)
of Torts, § 518 in Pullan v. Steinmetz. 16 P.3d 1245 (Utah 2000). The Court left for
another day the decision whether to adopt Section 518. However, the day has come.
This Court, in Pullen, stated that the plaintiff could not show that harm to Arielle
Pullen was unforeseeable because the defendants had no knowledge that the plaintiff or
other children were entering the stables and feeding the horses. Id, 2000 UT 103, ^f 13.
14

On its face, the case states that the harm was unforeseeable because the contact between
human and animal was unforeseeable.2
In this case, the undisputed facts reveal that an entirely different situation occurred.
The Mateuses claim the right to allow their cat to enter on the Jackson's private property.
The Mateuses conceded that they made no effort to control their pet's activities and failed
to prevent their cat from trespassing on others' property. (R. 133.) The Mateuses should
have been aware that their cat would come into contact with other persons. They should
have also known that "even ordinarily gentle animals are likely to be dangerous under
particular circumstances" and that their cat's contact could result in an attack and harm to
innocent persons. The reasoning set out by the Court in Pullan favors the adoption of
Section 518 and application of that Section in this case to hold the Mateuses liable for the
harm caused by their animal to Mrs. Jackson, because their cat's contact with others was
foreseeable.
Reading Pullan and Loonev v. Bingham Dairy, 260 P. 855 (1929), together, it is
readily apparent that Utah courts have endeavored to create a balance between the right of
animal ownership and the protection of innocent third parties from injury by those

2

"Simply maintaining a horse in a stable in a residential subdivision without
any knowledge or reason to know that a child from outside the Association was
frequenting the stables and hand feeding the horses without permission or supervision
is an insufficient basis on which to predicate negligence on the part of the defendant."
Pullan, 2000 UT 103 at f 13. Emphasis added.
15

animals. The court in Looney, stated that "when a domestic animal is rightly at the
place where the injury occurs, the owner is not liable unless the viciousness of the
animal and knowledge of such fact on the part of the owner are shown." Icf, at 857.
Emphasis added. This quote from Looney shows how the district court erred in the
present case: When an animal is confined and is previously unknown to be vicious, the
animal is unlikely to be placed in a position to cause injuries to others. Moreover, if the
animal is confined, its contact with third persons is regulated, and the chance that an
injury will occur is decreased. However, where, as in the present case, an animal is
allowed to stray, and its actions are unsupervised, the animal owner cannot claim that an
animal is "rightly at the place where the injury occurs", and there is no requirement that
the owner show that prior viciousness was not known. Where the animal is wrongfully at
the place that an attack occurs, an animal owner should not be allowed immunity from
liability under the rules set out in Looney and Pullan.
In this case, the Mateuses' cat was not rightly on the Jackson's property when the
injury occurred, and therefore, Mrs. Jackson need not show that the Mateuses have
knowledge of their cat's viciousness in order to impose liability for the cat's attack. The
above analysis reveals the injustice of the district court's ruling. The grant of summary
judgment to the Mateuses relieves a pet's owners of all responsibility over and for their
pet's actions, even where their actions have allowed the cat to come into contact with
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others in the first place. Moreover, the rule places the burden of regulating pets, and of
dealing physically, financially, and emotionally, with the injuries caused by other
person's animals, on persons significantly less able to control the animals. The rule of
law advocated by the Mateuses and approved by the trial court relieves the party most
able to control an animal of all responsibility to do so, and instead places that burden on
innocent third parties like Mrs. Jackson. If this Court is to continue utilizing tort law as a
device for protecting society, the parties most able to prevent injuries, the Mateuses in
this case, must be held accountable for their failure to do so.
d.

Pullan's requirement that an animal be rightly at the place
where the injury occurred.

Returning to Pullan, it must be noted that the Pullens conceded that they could not
meet the test for imposing liability on either of the Defendants because the horse was
rightly at the place where the injury occurred. However, in this case, Mrs. Jackson does
meet the test for imposing liability on the Mateuses, because their cat was not rightfully
on Ms. Jackson's property. The cat was an unwelcome trespasser at the time it attacked
Mrs. Jackson. The record reveals that Mrs. Jackson momentarily mistook the Mateuses'
cat for her own cat. Mrs. Jackson's temporary mistake of identity did not change the
animal's unwelcome status, and the trial court erred in holding that the Mateuses' cat had
a right to be on the Jacksons' property.
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Utah's courts and the Utah Legislature, as well as the Salt Lake County's
governing body, have recognized that animals have no right to trespass on other's
property, and in certain instances have imposed liability on animal owners when they fail
to restrain and/or prevent their animals from trespassing. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-8-64 (which gives boards of commissioners and city councils of cities power to
regulate and prohibit animals from running at large, within the limits of a city); Utah
Code Ann. § 4-25-4 (the purpose which is "to afford protection to the owners or real
properly against animals trespassing thereon.")3 See, Nielsen v. Hyland, 170 P. 778, 78081 (Utah 1918)(stating that one of the purposes of the statute regarding animal trespass is
to afford protection to the owners or real property against animals trespassing thereon.)
From these authorities, there is a general recognition in Utah that animals have no legal
right to be on another's property without permission from the property owner.
This point is supported by Section 8.24.030 of the Salt Lake County Ordinances
which states, in pertinent part, that it is unlawful for an animal owner to allow certain
animals off their premises unless the animal is restrained:
It is unlawful for the owner of any fierce, dangerous or vicious animal to
permit such animal to go off or be off the premises of the owner unless such

3

Mrs. Jackson concedes that Utah Code Ann. § 4-25-4 deals with large
animals. However, this statute is indicative of a public policy against allowing an animal
belonging to one person to enter on another's property.
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animal is under restraint and properly muzzled so as to prevent it from
injuring any person or property. . . .
Salt Lake County Ord. § 8.24.030. Because the defendants' cat was vicious4, fierce
and/or dangerous, it should not have been allowed to leave the defendants' premises
without restraint.5
Violation of the above ordinance is just one example of the fact that defendants'
cat was not rightfully on the Jacksons' property when the attack occurred. Defendants
cannot show that their cat was rightfully on the Jacksons' property at the time the cat
viciously attacked Mrs. Jackson, and they may be held liable for their negligence,
without requiring knowledge of viciousness of the cat, under Utah law.6

4

Salt Lake County Ordinance § 8.24.010, which defines a vicious animal as
one which "bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or otherwise attacks a human being..." Salt Lake
County Ord. § 8.24.010(B).
5

Viewed in a light most favorable to Mrs. Jackson, the facts reveal that the
Mateuses cat was vicious, fierce, and dangerous.
6

This analysis of absence of foreknowledge under the common law does not
even take into account the Salt Lake County Ordinance, § 8.24.210(C), which is clear in its
imposition of liability even where a pet owner has no foreknowledge of any propensity of
an animal to attack or cause injury.
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e.

Animal owners are required to understand that gentle animals
can be dangerous and are required to prevent foreseeable harm.

The Court in Pullan continued its analysis of the plaintiffs negligence cause of
action and addressed the standards set out in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 518, and
referenced comment h of Section 518, which provides:
one who keeps a domestic animal that possesses only those dangerous
propensities that are normal to its class is required to know its normal habits
and tendencies. He is required to realize that even ordinarily gentle
animals are likely to be dangerous under particular circumstances and to
exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm.
(Emphasis added). This Court found that the plaintiff in Pullan would be unable to meet
the requirements for imposing liability because the harm was unforeseeable.
However, comment h supports a finding that the Mateuses were negligent. A cat is
likely to be dangerous so as to require that its owner take care to prevent foreseeable
harm. Certainly, a cat's sharp claws and long, sharp teeth combined with its predatory
instincts and its tendency to attack and kill prey are traits of which a cat owner are
required to know.7 It is entirely foreseeable that when a cat is allowed to stray without
restraint, it will come into contact with other persons and be placed in a situation where it
could attack and bite a person. Under Section 518, comment h, the Mateuses were

7

"By nature, cats are predatory animals, stalking, chasing, catching, sometimes
'toying with,' then finally killing their prey, using their claws and teeth at various stages
throughout the ritual." Cheryl M. Bailey, Annotation, Liability for Injuries Caused by Cat,
68 ALR 4th 823, 829(1989).
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negligent in failing to realize that their cat, even if ordinarily gentle, could come into
contact with and harm other persons with its sharp teeth and claws. They were negligent
in failing to prevent their cat from coming into contact with others and for failing to
prevent Mrs. Jackson's injuries. Contrary to the defendants' unsupported assertion below
that cat owners cannot anticipate that their animals may attack or injure some innocent
person, Mrs. Jackson presented evidence to the trial court in the form of Dr. Vanderhoof s
deposition, where he testified that cat bites "are not uncommon" and that they can result
in serious injuries. The Mateuses presented only unsupported argument that cat bites
cannot be expected.8
The Mateuses have also argued that cats are not inherently dangerous animals.9
However, their argument fails to recognize the reality articulated in Comment h of the
8

Again, what defendants were really arguing was foreseeability, which was
a question of fact which should not have been resolved on summary judgment. The issue
of whether the cat bite was foreseeable should have been allowed to go to a jury.
9

Which was irrelevant to the issues before the trial court. However, it is
significant to note that despite the fact that Utah and several other jurisdictions have dog bite
statutes, courts have found that the dog species as a whole (excepting generally attack or
fighting dogs) is not inherently dangerous. Lundy v. California Realty, 216 Cal. Rptr. 575
(1985) (refusing to notice judicially that German shepherds are inherently dangerous); Sea
Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681 (1994) (quoting Rolen v. Maryland
Casualty Company, 240 So.2d 42, 44, (La.Ct.App. 1970) overruled on other grounds,
Holland v. Bucklev 305 So.2d 113, 114, 117 (La. 1974) ("With regard to tort liability for
keeping mischievous animals, most jurisdictions follow the rule that. . . animals which have
become domesticated by man, such as horses, cows, dogs, et cetera, . . . are regarded as
inherently safe.")

21

Restatement § 518, that any animal can be dangerous in particular situations. The
Mateuses' complete failure to regulate and control their cat's activities, and their uncaring
attitude for the rights of others living in close proximity to them shows a failure to
exercise reasonable care to prevent Mrs. Jackson's severe injuries.
The Mateuses have also argued that cats are good animals and are beneficial to
mankind and therefore liability for their pet's attack on Mrs. Jackson should not be
imposed on them. While persons may disagree regarding the merits of the cat species, the
inherent qualities of cats are not at issue in this case. The defendants' negligence is the
issue, and the trial court erred in holding as a matter of law that they should not be held
liable for their failure to control their cat. The district court had evidence of the
Mateuses' negligence and erred in granting summary judgment.
POINT III
A JURY COULD FIND THAT THE
MATEUSES WERE NEGLIGENT DUE
TO THEIR VIOLATIONS OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY ORDINANCES.
Salt Lake City Ordinance § 8.24.010 imposes liability on pet owners, when the
animal attacks another person, even where an owner may not know of the animal's
vicious propensities. Section 8.24.010 provides in pertinent part:
Any owner or person having charge, care or custody or control of an animal
or animals causing a nuisance, as defined below, shall be in violation of this
title and subject to the penalties provided in this title.
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Salt Lake County Ord. § 8.24.010(A).
Subsection B of the ordinance defines an animal as a nuisance as follows, "[a]ny
animal which bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or otherwise attacks a human being or
domestic animal on public or private property." See, Salt Lake County Ord.,
§ 8.24.010(B).
Salt Lake County Ord. § 8.24.030 also provides that:
It is unlawful for the owner of any fierce, dangerous or vicious animal to
permit such animal to go or be off the premises of the owner unless such
animal is under restraint and properly muzzled so as to prevent it from
injuring any person or property . . . .
These ordinances impose liability on a pet owner when he or she fails to properly
control and restrain a pet so as to prevent injuries and attacks. The Salt Lake County
ordinances do not in this case, as argued by the defendants before the district court,
impose strict liability on pet owners or require that all animals to be confined at all times.
Rather, the ordinances are merely evidence of the Mateuses' negligence and require them
to control their pet and take steps to prevent injuries and damages, such as Mrs. Jackson
experienced.
Violation of a safety standard set by statute or ordinance constitutes prima facie
evidence of negligence.10 Adkins v. Uncle Bart's. Inc., 1 P.3d 528 (Utah 2000). It cannot

1(

Prima facie evidence is "[t]hat quantum of evidence that suffices for proof
of a particular fact until the fact is contradicted by other evidence; once a trier of fact is faced
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be disputed that Salt Lake County Ordinance § 8.24.010 and § 8.24.030 are safety statutes
designed to protect human beings against the negligence of animal owners and the danger
of animal attacks. Furthermore, the undisputed material facts show that the Mateuses
violated the ordinance by failing to control an animal that "bites, inflicts injury, assaults,
or otherwise attacks a human being." See, Salt Lake Ord. § 8.04.210(C).
The rule of law adopted by the trial court is contrary to the plain language of Salt
Lake County Ordinance § 8.24.030, which states that a vicious animal that bites, inflicts
injury, assaults or otherwise attacks a human being, must be kept "under restraint [while
off the owner's premises] and properly muzzled to prevent it from injuring any person or
property." Id Under the Salt Lake County Ordinances cited above, if a pet owner fails
to control their pet while the animal is off their property, the owner may be held liable for
injuries that animal inflicts.
Mrs. Jackson provided evidence to the trial court which supported a finding that
the Mateuses violated Salt Lake County Ordinances. Contrary to Salt Lake County
Ordinance § 8.24.010, the Mateuses had care, custody or control over an animal that
caused a nuisance. Contrary to Salt Lake County Ordinance § 8.24.030, the Mateuses

with conflicting evidence, it must weigh the prima facie evidence with all of the other
probative evidence presented." Child v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425, 432 (Utah 1999) (quoting
Gaw v. State. 798 P.2d 1130, 1190 (Utah. App. 1990). Prima facie evidence of negligence
is evidence which would be sufficient to submit the question of negligence to the jury and
support a verdict of negligence. Id.
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allowed a vicious or dangerous animal off their premises and allowed it to come into
contact with and attack Mrs. Jackson. The evidence of the defendants' negligence should
have been submitted to the jury who could have then returned a verdict of negligence.
The trial court erred in not allowing the issues to go to the jury.
POINT IV
UTAH LAW DOES NOT ALLOW
AN ANIMAL ONE FREE BITE BEFORE
LIABILITY IS IMPOSED ON A PET OWNER.
The "one free bite" theory advocated by the defendants is unsupported by Utah
law. The defendants' theory is particularly unsustainable in this case where the
Mateuses' cat was trespassing, and was not rightly on the Jackson's property at the time
of the attack. In their summary judgment motion, the Defendants cited a 1989 ALR
Annotation (which Mrs. Jackson also quoted and which states that a cat owner must use
reasonable care, even without knowledge of viciousness, to control their cat), a 1987
Georgia case (Fellers v. Carson, 356 S.E.2d 658 (Ga. App. 1987)), and a 1976 Nebraska
case (Lee v. Weaver. 237 N.W.2d 149 (Neb. 1976)), and argued that "most" jurisdictions
require notice to an owner of an animal's viciousness before imposing liability on the
owner for injuries caused by the animal.
The outdated notion advocated by the defendants and upheld by the trial court was
shown to be falling into disfavor around the country. Mrs. Jackson provided the district
25

court with evidence that courts and legislatures around the United States are moving
toward a more rational, principled and fair approach for imposing liability on pet owners
when their pets cause damages to innocent persons. Utah has moved away from allowing
one free bite by dogs, as shown by the Utah Dog Bite Statute, found in Utah Code Ann. §
18-1-1, etseq.
Other states have also disposed of the outdated notion that an animal is allowed a
free bite before liability is imposed on its owner. For example, in Pennsylvania, the
legislature has amended its "Dangerous Dog Statute," and provides that the propensity of
an animal to attack may be proven by a single incident of infliction of severe injury or
attack on a human being without provocation. See 3 P.S. §§ 459-502-A to 459-507-A; 3
P.S. § 459-501-A (Repealed); Commonwealth v. Hake. 738 A.2d 46 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1999) (discussing the statute); See also Montana Code Ann. § 27-1-715; (providing that
dog owners are strictly liable for damages caused by their dogs); Arizona Revised
Statutes. § 11-1020 (same); Minn. Stat. § 347.22 (1990)( which reads in part: "If a dog,
without provocation, attacks or injures any person who is acting peaceably in any place
where the person may lawfully be, the owner of the dog is liable in damages to the person
so attacked or injured to the full amount of the injury sustained.") Among others, these
states have done away with the antiquated "one free bite" rule.
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Additionally, characterizing the rule as being one that was short of strict liability,
the court, in Hossenlopp v Cannon, 329 S.E.2d 438 (S.C. 1985), approved for use in
South Carolina a California jury instruction based on a California statute which holds a
dog owner liable for injuries inflicted by the animal, regardless of knowledge, or lack
thereof, of the animal's viciousness, and regardless of negligence, providing that the
victim does not invite attack or expose himself to attack while on the owner's property.
Applying that standard, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a dog's owners were
liable as a matter of law for dog bite injuries to a 4-year-old boy, notwithstanding the
owners' claim that there was a factual issue regarding their knowledge that their dog had
previously harmed others or had dangerous propensities. Accordingly, the court affirmed
the grant of summary judgment in favor of the injured boy on the issue of liability.
With regard to the Georgia case of Fellers v. Carson. 356 S.E.2d 658 (Ga.App.
1987), cited by Mateuses, that case was analyzed in the later case of Fields v. Thompson,
378 S.E.2d 390 (Ga.App. 1989). Fields noted that Fellers predated the enactment of a
Georgia statute § 51-2-7, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
A person who owns or keeps a vicious or dangerous animal of any kind and
who, by careless management or by allowing the animal to go at liberty,
causes injury to another person who does not provoke the injury by his own
act may be liable in damages to the person so injured. In proving vicious
propensity, it shall be sufficient to show that the animal was required to be
at heel or on a leash by an ordinance of a city, county, or consolidated
government, and the said animal was at the time not at heel or on a leash.
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The defendant in Fields, like defendants in this case, argued that he could not be
held liable for his animal's attacks because he had no knowledge of the animal's vicious
propensities. However, the court rejected the defendant's arguments pointing out that all
of the cases cited by the defendant is support of his position predated the amended statute
cited above. Therefore, that court held that the trial court erred in granting the defendant
summary judgment and reversed the judgment.
Fields is illustrative in showing that courts and legislatures are coming to realize
that giving an animal one free bite is no more just that allowing a motorist one free
accident, or a doctor one free instance of malpractice, or a criminal one free crime before
deciding to impose liability for such actions.11 Moreover, the uone free bite" theory
advocated by the defendants is particularly unsuited for this case where the undisputed
facts show the defendants to be notoriously irresponsible pet owners. It is not surprising
that defendants claim to be unaware of any other injuries inflicted by their cat. The
evidence shows that the defendants seem to turn a blind eye to their animals' activities.
Despite the evidence that shows that the defendants do not take steps to regulate
their animals or even take steps to practice ordinary, safe, or prudent pet control, they

11

Defendants are correct in stating that, unfortunately, Nebraska continues to
follow the old rule allowing animals one free bite. However, the Nebraska case cited by the
defendants is inapposite to this case as Utah legislators in Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1, et seq.,
and the Salt Lake County Ordinances show an express rejection of the worn-out "one free
bite" rule.
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argue that they cannot be held liable unless they were aware of any prior instances of
attacks or injuries. However, neither the common law, nor Utah statutes or the Salt Lake
County ordinances allow persons to avoid liability by asserting ignorance of their pet's
dangerous activities. The trial court erred in so ruling.
POINT V:
LIABILITY FOR INJURIES INFLICTED
BY A CAT SHOULD BE REGARDED
IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO THOSE
INFLICTED BY A DOG, OR ANY OTHER PET.
a.

Cat bites are common.

Cat bites, while perhaps occurring less frequently than dog bites are nevertheless
common and can often be much more severe and dangerous. The district court was
presented evidence in the form of the deposition of Dr. Eric Vanderhoof, who stated in
his deposition that cat bites are common and can be very serious:
Q.
A.

Just curious. This is my first case I've dealt with a cat bite.
They're not uncommon. Cat bites are pretty virulent.
Human bites and cat bites are pretty bad. The problem
with cat bites is that they have such sharp little teeth that
when they bite, the bacteria — because their mouths are
filthy - gets lodged inside there and has no way to get out.
When you have a dog bite you sort of lay the thing open and
you have a big open wound. That way the pus can't stay
trapped and it can get out. If you're not draining pus from
your body, oftentimes that's not a big problem. But when it
gets trapped underneath, that's when you get into trouble. So
cat bites tend to be more problematic than a lot of animal
bites.
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(R. 166.) Given the fact that cat bites are more dangerous than dog bites, in terms of
possible infection, there is no reason why the trial court or this Court should give a cat
owner the safe harbor of having one free bite when Utah dog owners receive no such
escape from liability.
b.

Utah law does not allow a dog one free bite.

The Utah Legislature has eliminated the element of foreknowledge of a dog's
viciousness in order to hold a dog owner liable for his animal's attacks in Utah Code Ann.
§ 18-1-1, as follows:
Every person owning or keeping a dog shall be liable in damages for
injury committed by such dog, and it shall not be necessary in any action
brought therefor to allege or prove that such dog was of a vicious or
mischievous disposition or that the owner or keeper thereof knew that
it was vicious or mischievous; but neither the state nor any county, city, or
town in the state nor any peace officer employed by any of them shall be
liable in damages for injury committed by a dog when: (1) The dog has
been trained to assist in law enforcement, and (2) the injury occurs while
the dog is reasonably and carefully being used in the apprehension, arrest,
or location of a suspected offender or in maintaining or controlling the
public order.
Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1. Emphasis added.
Despite a conscious decision by the Utah Legislature to impose liability on dog
owners for their animal's attacks, without requiring a showing that the owner know of
previous attacks, the Mateuses argue that they cannot be held liable for a cat attack under
similar circumstances. The Mateus's argument defies logic. The Utah Legislature has
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made an express decision to reject the antiquated "one free bite" doctrine, and there is no
reason why that decision should not apply with equal weight to cats as well a dogs.
Placing the burden of controlling an animal, whether cat or dog, on the pet's
owners reflects a just and principled approach to preventing animal attacks. Imposing
liability on pet owners also places the burden of preventing such attacks on the party most
capable to do so. By acting responsibly, a pet owner is in the best position to control and
restrain the animal and not allow it off of the owner's property, train the animal not to
attack or be dangerously aggressive, and prevent it from harming others. In addition, by
imposing liability on the Mateuses, Mrs. Jackson, an innocent party, is not required to
bear the costs of the Mateuses' negligence. Notions of justice and fair play require that
the Mateuses be held liable for their actions and for the actions of their cat. Therefore, the
trial court's ruling should be reversed, and the case should be allowed to proceed to trial
where the issues presented to the Court will be justly adjudicated.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the judgment of the district court which granted
summary judgment for the Mateuses. The facts of this case show that the Mateuses were
negligent in allowing their cat to come into contract with Mrs. Jackson, and that they had
a duty to exercise reasonable care to properly control their animal. The facts show that
they breached their duty and allowed their cat to cause Mrs. Jackson's injuries.
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Utah law does not allow an animal one free bite where the animal is an unwelcome
trespasser on its victim's property. Because the Mateuses' cat has no legal right to be on
Mrs. Jackson's property, there was no requirement that she show that the Mateuses have
prior knowledge of their cat's vicious propensities. The district court erred in so ruling.
Therefore, the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Mateuses should be
reversed and the district court should be order to allow the case to go to trial.
DATED this / ^

day of October, 2001.
STRONG & HANNI

Roger H. Bullock
Peter H. Barlow
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
Judith Campbell Jackson

32

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the J_

day of October, 2001, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant Judith Campbell Jackson was mailed, first-class
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Lynn S. Davies
Melinda A. Morgan
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
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P.O. Box 2465
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Attorneys for Defendants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JUDITH CAMPBELL JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS*
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DENYING
PLAINTIFFS CROSS-MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ROBERT MATEUS and KRIS MATEUS,
Civil No. 990904929
Defendants.
Judge Tyrone Medley

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment came on for hearing before the Honorable Tyrone Medley on March 5, 2001,
at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiff Judith Jackson Campbell was present. Plaintiff was represented by counsel
Roger Bullock and Peter Barlow. Defendants Robert Mateus and Kris Mateus were represented
by counsel Melinda A. Morgan. The Court, having reviewed the file in this matter, and having
permitted supplemental briefing by the parties, and otherwise being fully advised, now makes and
enters the following ruling:

SSfl

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This action arises out of a cat bite that occurred on or about January 15,

1996, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Plaintiff alleges that she was injured as a result of that cat bite because

defendants "negligently failed to restrain and control their cat." Slee Complaint at ^ 3.
3.

Even though the defendants dispute that it was their cat that actually bit

plaintiff, for the purposes of these motions, defendants assumed that their cat was the one that bit
plaintiff.
4.

Plaintiff provided no evidence to show that defendants had any prior

knowledge that their cat would cause harm to anyone, including bite or attack anyone.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

A prima facie case of negligence requires plaintiff to establish a duty owed

to her by defendants.
2.

In order to establish that duty, plaintiff has the burden to prove that it was

foreseeable to the defendants that their cat would bite plaintiff.
3.

Plaintiff is unable to show that it was foreseeable to the defendants that

their cat would harm anyone, including bite or attack anyone.
4.

Since plaintiff could not establish that the cat bite was foreseeable to

defendants, plaintiff is unable to show that the defendants owed her a duty to restrain their cat.
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5.

Because plaintiff cannot establish a duty was owed to her by defendants,

and because the establishment of this duty is necessary to prove a prima facie case of negligence
against defendants, plaintiff is unable to prove a case of negligence against them.
6.

This Court adopts the analysis and authorities of Defendants' Memorandum

in Support of Summary Judgment, defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, and defendants' Supplemental Briefing on Defendants' Motion for
summary Judgment, with one exception: this Court is not granting summary judgment to
defendants on the basis of defendants' argument that the Salt Lake County Ordinances are
unconstitutional.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED. Plaintiffs Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice in its entirety, each
party to bear its own costs.
DATED this

day of
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APPROVE AS TO FORM:
STRONG & HANN1

ROGER H. BULLOCK
PETER H. BARLOW
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument
was hand delivered on this^cA- day of March, 2001, to the following:
Roger H. Bullock
Peter H. Barlow
STRONG & HANNT
600 Boston Building
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM B:
SALT LAKE COUNTY
ORDINANCE § 8.04.210

Title 8 ANIMALS
Chapter 8.04 DEFINITIONS

8.04.210 Vicious animal.
"Vicious animal" means:
A. Any animal which, in a vicious and terrorizing manner approaches any person in apparent
attitude of attack upon the streets, sidewalks, or any public grounds or places;
B. Any animal with a known propensity, tendency or disposition to attach or to cause injury or
otherwise endanger the safety of human beings or animals; or
C. Any animal which bites, inflicts injury, assaults or otherwise attacks a human being or
domestic animal on public or private property. (Ord. 1019 § 3, 1988: prior code § 100-1-1
(20))

http://ordlink.com/codes/saltlkco/_.DATA/TITLE08/Chapter_..../8^04^210_Viciousjmimal_.htm 9/6/00

ADDENDUM C;
SALT LAKE COUNTY
ORDINANCE § 8.24.010

Title 8 ANIMALS
Chapter 8 24 ANIMAL BITES AND NUISANCES

8.24.010 Nuisance acts designated-Penalties.
A. Any owner or person having charge, care, custody or control of an animal or animals causing
a nuisance, as defined below, shall be in violation of this title and subject to the penalties
provided in this title.
B. The following shall be deemed a nuisance:
1. Any animal which:
a. Causes damages to the property of anyone other than its owner,
b. Is a vicious animal as defined in this title and kept contrary to Section 8.24.030 below,
c. Causes unreasonable fouling of the air by odors,
d. Causes unsanitary conditions in enclosures or surroundings,
e. Defecates on any public sidewalk, park or building, or on any private property without the
consent of the owner of such private property, unless the person owning, having a proprietary
interest in, harboring or having care, charge, control, custody or possession of such animal
shall remove any such defecation to a proper trash receptacle,
f. Barks, whines or howls, or makes other disturbing noises in an excessive, continuous or
untimely fashion,
g. Molests passersby or chases passing vehicles,
h. Attacks other domestic animals,
i. Otherwise acts so as to constitute a nuisance or public nuisance under the provisions of
Chapter 10, Title 76, Utah Code Annotated (1953);
2. Any animals which, by virtue of the number maintained, are offensive or dangerous to the
public health, welfare or safety. (Prior code § 100-1-16)

http://ordlink.com/codes/saltlkco/JDAT^

9/6/00

ADDENDUM D:
SALT LAKE COUNTY
ORDINANCE § 8.04.030

Title 8 ANIMALS
Chapter 8.24 ANIMAL BITES AND NUISANCES

8.24.030 Fierce, dangerous or vicious animals.
It is unlawful for the owner of any fierce, dangerous or vicious animal to permit such animal to
go or be off the premises of the owner unless such animal is under restraint and properly
muzzled so as to prevent it from injuring any person or property. Every animal so vicious and
dangerous that it cannot be controlled by reasonable restraints, and every dangerous and
vicious animal not effectively controlled by its owner or person having charge, care or control of
such animal, so that it shall not injure any person or property, is a hazard to public safety, and
the director of animal services shall seek a court order pursuant to Section 8.40.010 for
destruction of or muzzling of the animal. (Prior code § 100-1-15)
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